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ENFORCEMENT AND THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
George W. Downs*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the increasing prevalence and robustness of multilateral cooperation in areas as diverse as security and human rights has
inspired many international law scholars and international relations
theorists to question the value of enforcement. Those in what is often
referred to as the managerial school argue that formal enforcement
provisions are almost irrelevant. Sanctions of any sort are rarely employed because the few compliance problems that arise are rarely
deliberate attempts to defy a legal standard. Violations are more typically the result of nonvolitional factors such as treaty ambiguity and
State incapacity and hence should be dealt with using managerial techniques rather than coercion. Theorists in the transformationalist tradition
go even further to argue that enforcement is worse than irrelevant: its
existence exerts a negative impact on the evolution of cooperation by
reducing the willingness of States to join a regime and by fostering an
adversarial environment among those States that do become members.
The purpose of this article is to broadly characterize the political
economy or institutionalist theory of enforcement and to present data
that is at least a first step toward evaluating the managerial and transformationalist critiques. The first section will present a short, schematic
summary of the role of enforcement as it is currently viewed in the "new
institutions" or political economy literature in international relations.'
While doubtless familiar to many readers, this is an important point of
departure. A notable portion of the debate about the role of enforcement
continues to stem from differences in terminology and from the fact that
the political economy theory of enforcement is far more complicated
* World Politics of Peace and War Professor, Woodrow Wilson School and Department of Politics, Princeton University; Ph.D. University of Michigan (1976); B.A. Shimer
College (1967).
1. Political economy and new institutionalism are used interchangeably in what follows and represent the more deductive wing of international relations theory. For
descriptions of this theory, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern InternationalRelations Theory:
A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspectiveon Treaties: A Synthesis
of InternationalRelations Theory and InternationalLaw, 37 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 139 (1996).
For a perspective similar to the one presented here, see Duncan Snidal, Political Economy
and InternationalInstitutions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 121 (1996).
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than the normal form specification of the archetypical Prisoners' Dilemma game appears to suggest. Political economists do not argue that
enforcement is always essential or even possible, or that Tit-for-Tat is
always the optimal enforcement strategy. They make no prediction
about the relative frequency with which different types of games underlie cooperation and make relatively few general claims about the
character of the specific enforcement strategies that will be employed.
What they do emphasize is that the choice of enforcement strategy will
vary across contexts depending on factors such as the quality of compliance data, the nature of the good being regulated, and various kinds of
uncertainty.
The second and third sections deal with the managerial and transformationalist critiques. In response to the former which questions the
relevance of formal enforcement provisions, data from environmental
regimes are presented that suggest that such provisions are disproportionately present in regulatory agreements that require significant
changes in behavior. In a set of multilateral environmental agreements,
the correlation between what is termed the depth of cooperation and the
extent of enforcement is 0.74. Evidence is also presented that suggests
that as multilaterals increase their level of cooperation over time (e.g., in
the manner of the EU or WTO), they also increase their level of enforcement, a fact for which managerial theory provides little
explanation.
In response to the transformationalist critique, case examples are
presented that throw doubt on the contention that cooperative progress is
primarily driven by a transformationalist dynamic of collective deliberation and intraregime information diffusion. The impact of factors
such as changes in relative prices appear, as economists have long
claimed, to be more important. In addition, data are presented from
twenty-one environmental agreements that call into question the reliability of the process by which transformationalists regimes are
supposed to move states to ever-increasing levels of cooperation, and
suggest that enforcement is less of a barrier to evolution through expansion than critics contend.
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF ENFORCEMENT

In the political economy literature, enforcement generally refers to
the overall strategy that a State or a multilateral adopts to establish expectations in the minds of state leaders and bureaucrats about the nature
of the negative consequences that will follow noncompliance. It is thus a
deterrence strategy designed to maintain cooperation by preventing
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noncompliance from ever taking place. The actual response to a violation, called the punishment phase, is only one part of that strategy.
For understandable reasons, when many international lawyers think
of penalties for noncompliance they tend to think primarily in terms of a
combination of those defined by provisions of an agreement, those contained in the international law relating to treaties, primarily the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,2 and the opprobrium that is directed
via international public opinion at a party that defects from an international norm. Political economists, for equally understandable reasons,
are inclined to take a somewhat broader view. They would argue that
from a practical standpoint, there are important penalties not embodied
in agreements or operating through public opinion that rest on tacitly
established expectations regarding the consequences of noncompliance.
These include things such as the ad hoc organization of economic sanctions by one or more States, the withholding of a promised positive
incentive (e.g., a scheduled loan or technology transfer), the implementation of a linkage strategy such as barring a State from other
cooperative endeavors, or a retaliatory defection from the agreement in
question.3 For better (and worse), political economists tend to view such
strategies in an undifferentiated way. Any threatened action or combination of actions that the designers of an enforcement strategy believe
will operate to offset the net benefit that a .potential violater could gain
from noncompliance qualifies as a punishment strategy.! The legitimacy
of the strategy under international law is rarely an issue.
The difference in perspective regarding what constitutes an enforcement strategy is responsible for much of the descriptive tension between
international lawyers and political economists.5 Because political
2. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
For an extended discussion of the relationship between international law and breach of
treaty, see John Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and RationalistInternationalRelations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of

State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1 (1997).
3. This is not meant to suggest that there are not situations where certain kinds of
punishments will be more effective than others. See Edith Brown Weiss, Theme Plenary
Session: Implementation, Compliance, and Effectiveness, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998).

4. Sometimes theorists distinguish between an action that inflicts a cost (e.g., a fine or
sanction) and an action that withdraws a benefit (e.g., reciprocal noncompliance). See
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE

WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 152-53 (1995). The political economy
school does not make this distinction. A punishment/deterrent is anything that operates to
lower the expected net benefit of defection. Both decreasing the benefits of defection and

increasing its costs do this.
5.
There is also considerable normative tension between the two schools. Many international lawyers appear to shift their focus away from tacit and unilateral enforcement
strategies because they consider them illegitimate and inequitable, and believe that most will
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economists are interested in a broader variety of enforcement strategies
than are international lawyers, they almost invariably see enforcement
playing a larger role in maintaining compliance both in connection with
particular agreements and in the international system as a whole than do
international lawyers. International lawyers, while well aware of extralegal enforcement strategies, tend to focus on the role of formal provisions.6
A fundamental tenet of the political economy approach is that the
necessity for and feasibility of enforcement varies with the nature of the
underlying game.7 In a coordination game like the Battle of the Sexes,
for example, enforcement is not relevant because neither party can gain
by unilaterally defecting from any cooperative outcome.' Typical examples involve agreements that establish international rules for interstate
bank transfers, handling emergencies at sea, or notification procedures
for nuclear accidents. While one party may for distributional reasons
prefer one set of rules over another, the stability of any cooperative
agreement is assured because both parties believe that abiding by the
agreement produces better results than independent action.9
Enforcement is most relevant in connection with the well-known repeated Prisoners' Dilemma or mixed-motive game where States profit
from collective cooperation relative to joint noncooperation, but where
each State individually has an incentive to defect from any cooperative
arrangement. This defection incentive must be offset through the use of
a contingent punishment strategy. The most famous such strategy is
simple reciprocity or Tit-for-Tat in which a State begins by cooperating
and then retaliates for every defection with a counter-defection and
be replaced as international law evolves. Political economists, with few exceptions, duck the
legitimacy issue on the grounds that extralegal enforcement is a fact of international life that
will persist into the foreseeable future. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM AT RISK 48-57 (199 1) (describing one of the exceptions).
6. See THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994); GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, TACIT
BARGAINING, ARMS RACES, AND ARMS CONTROL 10-17 (1995) [hereinafter DOWNS &
ROCKE, TACIT BARGAINING] (describing the extra-legal enforcements during the arms race
and downplaying the role of formal treaties in this process).
7. See generally JAMES MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS (1994)
(introducing these types of games and their significance for cooperation).
8. This at least is true in the standard theory. One could argue that enforcement might
still play a role in some coordination games in order to lend greater stability to a particular
pattern of distribution. If the relative power of one or more States increased, the party that
gained in power might violate the agreement in order to renegotiate its terms and thus claim
a larger distributional benefit. A credible enforcement strategy would increase the costs of
such a tactic.
9. See James Morrow, Modeling the Forms of InternationalCooperation: Distribution
Versus Information,48 INT'L ORG. 387 (1994) (discussing negotiation difficulties associated
with coordination agreements).
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matches every cooperative move with cooperation.' ° If the discount rate
is sufficiently low, this contingent strategy creates a situation where
whatever might be achieved by a defector exploiting another State during any one round of the game is more than offset by the foregone
benefits of cooperation that it sacrifices during the retaliation or punishment period.
It should be clear that the frequency of enforcement depends on the
distribution of games underlying agreements. This cannot be derived
from game theory, and there are reasons to believe that it may well
change over time. For example, the fact that defection is not a threat in
coordination games suggests that coordination game-based agreements
will be easier to achieve than will Prisoners' Dilemma-based agreements
during the early evolution of a regime when mutual mistrust and uncertainty are likely to be highest. Evidence that this is true can be found in
the fact that the agreements that emerge in the early stages of relatively
new regimes such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) often
consist of little more than statements of principles or the establishment
of negotiating forums from which there is little incentive to defect."
This suggests, in turn, that in a policy area (e.g., environmental regulation) where there are a significant number of relatively young
multilateral institutions, the role and importance of enforcement will be
less than it is likely to be thirty years later.'2
Despite its name, the strategy of reciprocity is not designed to uphold some principle of equity-based justice. At least with respect to the
standard formulation, compensation for damage suffered is not at issue.
This is not because political economists are indifferent to equity justice,
but because they are chiefly preoccupied with deterrence. A punishment
that effectively compensates the victim State might be large enough to
deter defectors, but the benefit to the defecting State could easily be
greater than the cost suffered by the victim State. 3
10. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984);
MICHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION (1976).
11. See MILES KAHLER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

OF INTEGRATION 111-16 (1995).
12. This is not to argue that the trend toward increased enforcement will go on forever,
or cannot, to some extent, even be reversed. There is, for example, the suggestion that in the

past ten years the diffusion of free trade ideology has made the enforcement of certain free
trade standards less necessary. See KENNETH A. OYE, ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION AND
POLITICAL EXCHANGE 139 (1994). Similarly, one can argue that the end of the Cold War has,
for the moment at least, reduced the role of enforcement in maintaining the arms control
regime between the United States and Russia.
13. In a Coasean treaty equilibrium, such imbalances would never arise. See Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE
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It follows from the nature of reciprocity that the level of threatened
punishment needed to dissuade a State from violating an agreement
depends on the benefits that the State would gain from defection. In a
Prisoners' Dilemma these benefits are defined by what a State could
gain if it defected while the other State or States continued to cooperate.
The larger that amount, the greater the incentive to defect and the
greater the threatened punishment that is necessary to deter it. For example, to prevent a State from violating an environmental agreement
where the violation would save the State twenty million dollars in pollution abatement costs requires more aggressive enforcement and a
larger penalty than is necessary to prevent a violation that would save it
only two million dollars.14
The basic Prisoners' Dilemma and Tit-for-Tat are useful for illustrating the logic of cooperation, but if taken too literally they can be
misleading. For example, it is important not to become too preoccupied
with the "in-kind" nature of the retaliations used in simple examples.
The response to defection is nothing more than a punishment that can
consist of any response that is sufficiently costly to the other party.
Instead, of retaliating to overfishing by overfishing themselves, other
Member States might simply invoke a provision which charges a fine for
non-compliance. Alternatively, they could rely on political solutions that
lie outside the boundaries of the agreement such as Withdrawing part of
their diplomatic missions' or halting negotiations on some seemingly
unrelated issue. The variety of available punishment threats means that
it is wrong to claim, as many do, that punishment strategies are infeasible in an area like environmental cooperation because collective
pollution is not a credible deterrent to violations."5
The above should not be interpreted to imply that it is easy to devise
a workable enforcement strategy in any situation that appears to have
the basic characteristics of a Prisoners' Dilemma or that any enforceMARKET AND THE LAW (1988); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). The frequency and nature of these imbalances in the

international realm is an interesting topic for future research.
14. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION?
DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1995)
[hereinafter DOWNS & ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION?]; George W. Downs et al., Is the
Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996)
(weighing the costs and benefits of enforcement and compliance).
15. It is also true that in-kind responses are sometimes less incredible than they first appear. While members of an environmental regime are unlikely to threaten mass pollution as
punishment for one State's violation of an agreement, expectations may be established within
the regime that persistent violations on the part of any member will lead other members to
relax the aggressiveness with which they police their own industries' compliance in order to
insure that they are not competitively disadvantaged.
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ment strategy can be employed in any context. One constraint involves
the nature of the good being regulated. For multilaterals hoping to
regulate a public good such as pollution reduction, the inability to exclude a violator from the benefits of cooperation generated by those
states in compliance makes the creation of effective punishment strategies (or recruiting many members in the first place) a complicated
business. This is due to both the incentive for States to "free ride" on the
collective efforts of other States and to the fact that the incentive of
States to punish violators falls as the number of members increases.16
Enforcement in a multilateral institution is often likely to involve
more than a simple system of reciprocal punishments. One reason is
because in situations like the one just described above, cooperation is
often possible only if noncompliance is punished by the withholding of
benefits generated by another agreement to which it is "linked" (e.g., a
trade agreement) or by loss of reputation that will limit the violator's
ability to participate in subsequent agreements. Another more subtle
motivation for the creation of a more complicated enforcement system
is that the use of ad hoc, reciprocal punishments tends to be relatively
inefficient. States will invariably have different information about
whether or not a violation has taken place and how serious it was. This
will lead members of the multilateral to form different judgments about
the punishment that is required. A formal dispute resolution system will
operate to improve the accuracy of the violation assessment and coordinate the appropriate punishment.
A more elaborate system of adjudication with a variety of punishments such as fines not only constitutes a more nuanced punishment
than reciprocal action that can be better calibrated to reflect the seriousness of a given instance of noncompliance, it allows States to reach a
collective perception of an agreement's importance relative to other
agreements. It also enables States to signal the degree to which they are
committed to complying with a particular agreement both to each other
and to their domestic constituencies. The latter is particularly important.
When dealing with domestic firms that fear they will be held to standards that firms in rival States will not, it is far more convincing if
proponents of an agreement can point to a provision that specifies a
formal adjudication process and a strong punishment for noncompliance
than for them to refer to something as nebulous as reciprocal retaliation
or the principle of diffuse reciprocity.

16. See Scott Barrett, InternationalEnvironmental Agreements as Games, in CONFLICTS
AND COOPERATION IN MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES 11, 11-13 (Rtldiger Petrig

ed., 1992).

MichiganJournal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 19:319

Such considerations do not make reciprocal punishments irrelevant.
Reciprocal punishments or linkages to other cooperative agreements
directly or through reputation are still necessary to insure that States
cooperate in the multilateral's judicial process and obey the outcome
that is reached. However, by remaining in the background as the alternative of last resort, the enforcement process is able to operate far more
efficiently than it could otherwise. Because these efficiency gains are
likely to be the greatest in those agreements that embody the most cooperation, one suspects that over their lifetimes, multilaterals dealing with
Prisoners' Dilemmas will, in general, engage in increasingly more formal and more refined compliance rulemaking as they grow more
cooperative."
Tit-for-Tat is only one of a large family of effective reciprocal
strategies. Stronger punishments are also effective since they too offset
the benefits of defection whenever Tit-for-Tat does, and sometimes they
are necessary to offset the impact of a high discount rate."' In addition,
the relative efficacy and efficiency of any strategy varies with complications that are intentionally omitted from the basic model such as the
quality of information that is available about the existence of treaty
violations and each party's uncertainty about the utility that it and the
other party derives from violating an agreement.1 9
In the presence of uncertainty about whether a violation has occurred-a situation that frequently arises in connection with both arms
control and trade agreements-Tit-for-Tat runs into another problem.
The difficulty is not just that a violation might go undetected, but also
that there will be "false positives" or apparent violations that are not real
but will prompt retaliation and potentially a downward spiral of counterretaliation. 0 More efficient strategies involve reducing the penalty for
noncompliance or, better, increasing the penalty while employing a
"trigger" that takes the expected observational error into consideration
by increasing the amount of information that is required to prompt the
judgment that a violation has taken place. The greater the degree of
17. This behavior is true at least until, like any other institution, the multilaterals reach a
point where the transaction costs associated with red tape and bureaucracy exceed the marginal benefit of an additional rule or penalty.
18. See MORROW, supra note 7, at 266 (discussing the efficacy of punishments stronger
than Tit-for-Tat in high discount rate environments).
19. This omission may explain why the fit between international institutions and the
prescriptions implied by the simpler versions of what Setear refers to as "optimal deterrence
theory" are so unsatisfactory. See Setear, supra note 2, at 70.
20. See DOWNS & ROCKE, TACIT BARGAINING, supra note 6, at 179-90 (discussing in-

formation uncertainty connected with arms control violations); DOWNS & ROCKE, OPTIMAL
IMPERFECTION?, supra note 14, at 93-99 (exploring uncertainty connected with trade violations).
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information uncertainty, the higher the trigger level and the more
evidence is required before the penalty phase of the enforcement strategy is implemented.2
Decisionmaker uncertainty about the benefits that defection would
yield their own State or a rival also has an effect on the choice of enforcement strategy. Depending on circumstances, it might lead to States
committing themselves to penalty levels that are either considerably less
or greater than those required by Tit-for-Tat. For example, one explanation for the GATIT's weak enforcement provisions which appear to
contradict the precepts of game theory is that state policymakers did not
want aggressive enforcement of the GATT because while they believed
that a commitment to free trade would usually bring them political
benefits, they also knew that periodically (e.g., during severe recessions)
the demands of import-competing interest groups would be such that the
political costs connected with ignoring them would be very high. While
this might appear to be easily dealt with by a simple contingency clause,
decisionmakers were both uncertain about the exact conditions under
which they would want to violate the agreement and fearful that if they
included a clause permitting violations on demand, policymakers of
rival States would employ it for purposes of exploitation. Under these
conditions, a sensible strategy was to agree to penalties that were high
enough to discourage States from frequent violations and generally
sustain an atmosphere of free trade, but not so high as to make it impossible for policymakers to reap the benefits of defection when the payoff
for doing so exceeded some threshold." The result was a system in
which the expected cost of defection seemed irrationally low from the
perspective of maintaining free trade, but from the perspective of politicians facing reelection and the necessity of fundraising, it provided a
sensible way to cope with uncertainty about the future demands of their
interest groups while still providing a disincentive to opportunistic policymakers in other States.
In sum, despite its apparent simplicity, the political economy theory
of enforcement suggests that the optimal enforcement strategy in a particular case will vary depending on a number of factors such as the
nature of the good being regulated, the quality of compliance data that is
available, and utility uncertainty. The theory certainly does not predict
that when enforcement provisions exist they will exactly embody Tit21. While such trigger strategies may be the most efficient option from an economic
standpoint, they are often politically problematic because they expose policymakers to
charges that they ignore treaty violations by other States. To the extent that this leads to an
undersupply of such strategies, cooperation will break down more frequently than is necessary, as politicians are forced to retaliate for nonexistent treaty violations.
22. See DOWNS & ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION?, supra note 14, at 88.
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for-Tat or any other simple principle of reciprocity. As we have seen,
any number of enforcement strategies are consistent with the theory
depending on the conditions. This makes the underlying theory difficult
to test. Data like those presented in this article represent nothing more
than a small first step and should be viewed with a healthy dose of
skepticism. The arduous business of trying to verify empirically the
political economy theory's claims-or those of the two competing visions that are outlined below-has only barely gotten underway.
II. THE MANAGERIAL CHALLENGE
0

The first of two interrelated challenges to the political economy vision of the role that enforcement plays in maintaining cooperation
comes from what I will refer to as the "managerial school." While much
of the managerial argument is consistent with the message of political
economists, the breadth of its attack on the realist school of international relations spills over as an implicit critique of the political
economy school of enforcement as well. In particular, the managerialists
assume that the majority of treaty violations are neither premeditated or
deliberate but are caused instead by three factors: "(1) ambiguity and
indeterminacy of treaty language, (2) limitations on the capacity of
parties to carry out their undertakings, and (3) the temporal dimensions
of the social, economic, and political changes contemplated by regulatory treaties. ' 3
Under these circumstances, what best ensures compliance is not the
threat of punishment, but "a plastic process of interaction among the
parties concerned in which the effort is to reestablish, in the microcontext of the particular dispute, the balance of advantage that brought the
agreement into existence."24 Given the sources of most noncompliance,
this can most effectively be done by (1) improving dispute resolution
procedures, (2) providing technical and financial assistance, and (3)
increasing transparency." The latter is especially important.26
Managerialists are certainly well-aware of the fact that cooperation
is sometimes driven by mixed-motive games, but in such cases they
appear to believe that enforcement is handled primarily by either social
opprobrium or reciprocal defection rather than by invoking an agree23. CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 4, at 10.
24. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance in International
Regulatory Regimes, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 280, 303 (Jessica Tuchman

Mathews ed., 1991) [hereinafter Chayes & Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance].
25. See CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 4, at 22-25.
26. See id. at 152-53.
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ment's formal enforcement provisions. They tend to emphasize the
former since they believe that as a practical matter reciprocal enforcement can be problematic: "Retaliatory non-compliance often proves
unlikely because the costs of any individual violation may not warrant a
response, and it cannot be specifically targeted, imposing costs on those
that have consistently complied' 7 without hurting the targeted violator
enough to change its behaviour. "1
The bottom line is that for managerialists better management rather
than the design and implementation of more effective enforcement
strategies holds the key to the future of regulatory cooperation in the
international system." As Oran Young puts it, "arrangements featuring
enforcement as a means of eliciting compliance are not of much use in
international society."2 9 Moreover, "[t]he crucial point is that it is virtually impossible to achieve high levels of implementation and
compliance over time through coercion."30
It is interesting to examine the managerialist critique in light of the
theory of enforcement outlined in the first section. Neither the managerial theory's emphasis on coordination nor its evidence that, in general,
enforcement plays a small role in maintaining treaties are by themselves
inconsistent with the political economy theory. Political economists
make no general claims about the relative frequency of coordination
games and mixed-motive games or about the proportion of mixedmotive games that is shallow and the proportion that is deep. It only
contends that if agreements relate to mixed-motive or Prisoners' Dilemma games, they will require some kind of enforcement and that the
more deeply cooperative such agreements are, the more important the
role of enforcement will usually have to be. In order to present evidence
counter to these contentions, one must demonstrate that the level of
enforcement is unrelated to the type of agreement and its depth or that
the degree of compliance associated with deep mixed-motive agreements is unrelated to the level of enforcement.

27. Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: A Synthesis, 2 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY &
INT'L ENVTL. L. 327, 330 (1993).

28. For a discussion of the role of deliberation and premeditation, see CHAYES &
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 4, at 9-10.
29. ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 74 (1994).

30. Id. at 134. A political economist might argue that the equation of enforcement with
coercion is dubious when the enforcement provision is part of a multilateral agreement freely
entered into as well as in connection with the strategy Tit-for-Tat. In the case of the former,
enforcement seems analogous to the exercise of a contingency clause for nonperformance
that is part of a contract. In the case of Tit-for-Tat, enforcement amounts to nothing more
than the refusal to cooperate in the face of noncooperation.
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The claim that the political economy model is suspect because most
treaty violations are caused by factors such as the ambiguity of treaties
and capacity limitations rather than the product of premeditated exploitation is problematic because the former does not necessarily preclude
the latter. This makes determining the issue of which school is correct
more difficult than it first appears. For example, the ex post claim that a
particular treaty provision is ambiguous would not surprise many political economists. Not only do they recognize that every agreement is, to
some extent, incomplete and ambiguous, but they would suspect that it
is often a sensible strategy to claim ambiguity as a cover for noncompliance-a strategy that the managerialist proposals would seem to
encourage. They also suspect that ambiguity is often built into the
agreement intentionally as a device that negotiators can use strategically
to reap the political benefits of reaching an agreement when one might
otherwise not be achieved.
For slightly more complicated reasons, deliberation is also not necessarily unrelated to noncompliance that appears to be caused by
capacity limitations. Capacity limitations, whether we are talking about
the extent and quality of administrative oversight or the financial resources devoted to implementing an agreement's provisions, are only
partly exogenous. They also involve different varieties of the principalagent problem." For example, unless oversight is perfect, the top level
policymakers responsible for their States signing an agreement have
imperfect control over the administrators in charge of implementing its
many details. When this is the case, as it invariably is to some degree,
problems can arise in implementation that are not directly the product of
deliberate calculation on the part of the top-level policymaker, but are
the product of deliberation on the part of the implementing official who
may find it more profitable or simply easier to do a less vigorous job of
implementation than he might be capable.
Another problem springs from the fact that the energy that the top
policymaker puts into oversight is also invariably a function of that
official's incentives, and these are tied to the principal agent relationship
that exists between her and her political constituency. This is one reason
why both politicians and business executives frequently develop more
oversight capacity when their respective constituencies become animated by a fiscal crisis or a serious scandal.
Tying ambiguity and capacity limitations to premeditation and deliberation may appear to be nothing more than an academic exercise, but
it bears on the questions of how effective the managerial solutions are
31. For an accessible discussion of the principal-agent problem and moral hazard, see
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 165-222 (2d ed. 1994).
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likely to be. If, for example, the managerialists are correct that the ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language is unrelated to deliberation
or premeditation, we would expect that if a compliance problem was
discovered States would be eager to commence negotiations to clarify
matters and would be able to resolve the problem in most cases fairly
easily. If the political economy school is correct, this is unlikely to occur
because it was the inability of the States to successfully resolve the issue
through negotiation that led to the creation of the ambiguity in first
place.
The political economy school would also predict that the managerial
solutions to noncompliance like capacity building, resolving ambiguity,
and negotiation will also be less successful in reducing noncompliance
than the managerialists hope because they will be unable to resolve the
principal agent problem(s) that were at least partly responsible for the
treaty violation. The capacity building solution would have to be handled with particular care in order to avoid the generation of moral
hazard problems. When the response to noncompliance is the infusion
of resources, it can be all too easy for the violator and other States that
might not presently be violators to conclude that noncompliance is, if
not profitable, not as urgent a concern as they may previously have
believed.
While the managerial critique may not have presented evidence that
challenge the theory of enforcement's validity in connection with
mixed-motive games, it does challenge its relevance by claiming that
enforcement is unimportant. 2 Two prominent pieces of evidence marshaled in support of this claim is that punishments of any sort are rarely
meted out by multilateral agencies and that the dispute resolution
mechanisms that are in place are rarely employed.
The problem with these statistics, however, is that neither can serve
as a reliable basis for evaluating a deterrence strategy. If an enforcement
strategy is successful, it will deter States from violating the agreement
and punishment either will never take place or such violations will take
place only rarely either as the result of low-quality information about
compliance or credibility problems. This means that the fact that punishments are rare can just as easily be interpreted as evidence that
enforcement is operating effectively as that it is irrelevant. The data are
simply indeterminate. Some other test is needed.
Estimating the importance of formal enforcement provisions by the
incidence of an enforcement-related behavior such as the initiation of
dispute resolution proceedings is usually vulnerable to similar inference
32. See CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 4, at 152.
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problems. Suppose, for example, that one were to look at the percentage
of compliance problems that were settled by bilateral negotiation outside the context of the formal dispute resolution system. While it might
appear that a high number indicates that enforcement is irrelevant, it is
impossible to know (as in the case of plea bargaining) how important it
was that the negotiation took place in the shadow of a more formal
enforcement process to which the case might be referred if a settlement
were not reached. This indicator also suffers from the shortcoming of
assuming that the set of violations settled informally is representative of
the set of all violations when it is always possible that they have been
settled informally because they are the least serious and involve the
lowest stakes.
If it is next to impossible to estimate the relative importance of formal enforcement and the validity of the political economy theory of
enforcement by looking at the incidence of punishments or the frequency with which the formal dispute resolution system is employed,
how can it be evaluated? No strategy is fully satisfactory, but one potentially helpful approach is to let the actions of States speak for
themselves. In a recent paper, two colleagues and I tried to assess the
extent to which States believe enforcement is important in the area of
environmental regulation. We reviewed the treaty texts for the fifty
multilateral environmental agreements listed in the United Nations
Environmental Programme Register of International Treaties and Other
Agreements in the Field of the Environment that are currently in force
and to which the United States is a signatory33 and discovered that
thirty-five had no enforcement provisions at all or refer only to nonbinding arbitration. Five others describe a response to violations such as
other States taking "appropriate action" that is too ambiguous to categorize with any confidence and might, in any event, be designed to deal
with managerial issues such as uncertainty reduction or capacity building. However, ten agreements, or twenty percent of the total, refer
explicitly to a specific sanction or sanctioning procedure, fines, or domestic enforcement.
Another. test of the extent to which States perceive enforcement to
be important involves the political economy theory's contention that the
level of enforcement formally specified in a multilateral agreement will
be related to its "depth of cooperation." Depth of cooperation has been
variously defined in the literature, but as used here it refers to an estimate of either (1) the amount of behavioral change that an agreement
33. George W. Downs et al., Designing Multilaterals: The Architecture and Evolution of
Environmental Agreement, Presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political

Science Association (Aug. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Downs et al., Designing Multilaterals].
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requires of signatories or (2) the magnitude of the behavioral change
that an agreement has actually brought about among signatories." The
relevance of depth of cooperation to the political economy theory of
enforcement stems from the fact that in the context of a Prisoners' Dilemma game it can function as an indirect estimate of the benefit that
the. States could gain by defection because, ceteris paribus, the larger
the departure a treaty requires from previous practices, the more that it
will cost a State to comply with it. The political economy theory predicts that this increase. in the incentive for defection will have to be
offset by increases in the size of the threatened punishment. If state
policymakers believe the same thing, there should be a positive relationship between the strength of enforcement and the depth of cooperation.
To evaluate this prediction, each of the fifty environmental agreements was assigned a depth of cooperation score and a level of
enforcement score. We chose to employ the second of the above definitions because it most directly relates to the actual rather than anticipated
impact of enforcement. Depth of cooperation was estimated by calculating the behavioral change that a treaty has brought between the time
an agreement was created (i.e., the counterfactual was estimated to be
the status quo at the time the agreement was first signed) and recent
published descriptions of the impact that the agreement has had on
Member States." Consistent with the expectations generated by the
political economy theory of enforcement, the correlation between this
admittedly crude depth of cooperation and the level of enforcement is
0.74, which is Significant at the 0.01 level. At least among this set of
environmental agreements, the agreements that require the deepest cooperation also have the strongest enforcement provisions.
If the enforcement theory is true, the level of enforcement should
also track the evolution of cooperation within a given agreement-at
least within a mixed motive agreement-as well as in a cross-sectional
sample of agreements. I know of no data set that can be used to address
this question systematically, but the history of some prominent trade
agreements, where the most cooperative evolution has taken place and
where many agreements are suspected (at least by political economists)
to be solutions to Prisoners' Dilemma games, is suggestive. Commentators argue, for example, that the Uruguay Round's progress in
34. Estimating depth of cooperation can be impossible when the provisions of an
agreement require qualitative changes in behavior, such as installing a hotline between
Washington and Moscow. However, it is usually possible to do this when the agreement's
requirements are described quantitatively (e.g., a reduction in tariffs by 4%, a rollback in
emissions to 1990 levels), as is the case in many trade, arms control, and environmental
agreements.
35. See Downs et. al, supra note 33, at 25.
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substantially reducing "many of the most egregious trade barriers
around the world" was matched by an enhanced ability of the WTO to
punish trade violations more promptly and reliably.36 The principle of
consensus voting, where both parties to a dispute possessed a veto in the
adoption of panel reports, has been reversed and a new system has been
adopted that provides for the automatic adoption of panel reports, including retaliation, unless a unanimous consensus rejects it. In addition,
retaliation is now authorized automatically in the absence of a withdrawal of the offending practice or compensation by the defendant.
Such provisions are no accidental accompaniment to greater trade cooperation. The negotiating history of the Uruguay Round gives every
indication that without these provisions there would have been no
agreement.
The deepening of European integration exhibits a similar pattern.
Ann-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli point out that simultaneous with
the increased cooperation embodied in the Maastricht Treaty, Member
States chose to strengthen the European Court of Justice's power to
monitor and punish defection.37 In the European case, increased enforcement took the form of penetration of EC law into the domestic law
of its Member States, but it nonetheless took place and the expansion
was a formal one.38
It is possible, of course, that the demands of States that deeper
agreements be accompanied by stronger enforcement provisions are real
but somehow misconceived. That is, States may believe, contrary to the
advice of managerialists but consistent with the advice of political
economists, that enforcement is useful in connection with a certain
important category of agreements but they are simply wrong. This is not
an easy argument to counter because the cleanest way to test such a
claim would be to examine the compliance histories associated with a
substantial number of relatively deep agreements that were identical in
every respect except that some were enforced and some were not enforced. Managerialists would expect the compliance histories of the two
types of agreements to be relatively similar; political economists would
expect them to be different. Unfortunately, the very feasibility of such an
experiment on any substantial scale requires that the political economy
theory be more descriptively incorrect than it appears to be in the case
of our set of environmental agreements where the correlation between
depth of agreement and the presence of enforcement provisions tells us
36. BAYARD & ELLIoTr, supra note 6, at 336.

37. See Ann Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court:A PoliticalTheory
of Legal Integration,47 INT'L ORG. 41, 74 (1993).

38. See id. at 43.

Winter 1998]

Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation

that States usually choose (whether wisely or naively) to attach enforcement provisions to the deep agreements that they create.
Nonetheless, isolated examples of mismatches between depth and
enforcement do exist, and such agreements often appear to suffer from
the kinds of compliance problems that the political economy theory of
enforcement leads us to expect. One such mismatch occurred in connection with the long series of ambitious but weakly enforced fishing
agreements issued under eleven international fisheries commissions.39
Another is the GATT where for many years its lofty aspirations with
regard to reducing or eliminating numerous barriers to free trade were
hopelessly mismatched with a dispute resolution system that operated at
a ponderous pace and issued rulings that could be vetoed by the losing
party. The result was numerous violations such as quantitative restrictions by the United States on the importation of sugar, Japanese
restrictions on beef and citrus, and Canadian export restrictions on unprocessed salmon and herring. 40
To summarize, the managerialists have made an important contribution to our knowledge of the ecology of international agreements by
emphasizing that the majority of agreements require little enforcement
and that the compliance problems that emerge in connection with these
agreements are often best handled by joint problem solving rather than
by the application of some formal sanction. What they have failed to do
is to show that enforcement provisions are largely irrelevant. States
include enforcement provisions in a significant minority of the some of
the most substantively important multilateral agreements and these
provide a potentially important part of the background in which negotiations take place. More importantly, at least in connection with a
significant number of environmental agreements there is every indication that States demand that the role of enforcement and formal
enforcement provisions increase before they will agree to increase the
level of cooperation. The relatively low compliance rates associated
with these deep agreements that do not possess substantial enforcement
provisions suggests that this demand is not misconceived.

39. See M.J. Peterson, InternationalFisheries Management, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
EARTH 249, 280 (Peter M. Haas et. al. eds., 1993).
40. See BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 6, at 233; ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 217-19, 568-69 (1993).
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III. THE TRANSFORMATIONALIST CHALLENGE
The second challenge to the political economy conception of enforcement comes from the transformationalist school.4 ' Although related
to managerialism in a variety of ways and advocated by some of the
same authors, the transformationalist critique is worth treating separately because it focuses less on the role that enforcement plays in
maintaining current levels of cooperation than on its potentially counterproductive impact on the evolution of a cooperative regime.
Transformationalists believe that by inducing States to participate in
collective deliberation and exposing them to new information, participation in a regime often produces a series of mutually reinforcing shifts
in their policy preferences that leads them to prefer ever-increasing
levels of cooperation. The preferences and even underlying values of
States are changed as they are, in effect, socialized by the regime to the
potential benefits of an increasingly ambitious regulatory agenda. 2
To best facilitate this transformational process, advocates often recommend the adoption of four design principles: (1) the number of
Member States participating in the institution should be universal or
nearly so; (2) the nature of initial commitments and obligations should
be as soft and unthreatening as possible, consisting of few, if any, specific performance targets or timetables; (3) rules for decisionmaking
should require near unanimity; and (4) processes employed to maintain
compliance should emphasize dispute avoidance and negotiated compliance management to the exclusion of more coercive enforcement
mechanisms. 3
It is not difficult to appreciate the connection between these design
prescriptions and the transformationalist belief in progress through
orchestrated preference change. If regimes are instruments of preference
change, it makes sense to include as many States as possible even
those-or perhaps especially those-States that presently have little
interest in interstate cooperation. The other three prescriptions help
foster this goal of maximum inclusion. The absence of demanding initial obligations minimize up-front costs, while a unanimity standard or a
41. See George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model: A Triumph of Hope or
Experience? (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (analyzing the transformational
model) [hereinafter Downs et al., The Transformational Model].
42. Other examples of the impact that participation in regimes and institutions can have
on State preferences can be found in Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilizationof
Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J.INT'L
L. 384 (1996); Jutta Brunnde & Stephen J. Troope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J.INT'L L. 26 (1997); Marc A. Levy et al.,
The Study of InternationalRegimes, I EUR. J. INT'L REL. 267, 283-85 (1995).
43. See Downs et al., The Transformational Model, supra note 41, at 9-20.
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demanding supermajoritarian voting rule (e.g., requiring a three-fourths
majority of participating States to alter the agreement) assures members
that the level of cooperation required by the agreement will not increase
without their consent. Weak or nonexistent enforcement standards assure prospective members that they will not be forced to abide by a rule
or standard that they do not agree with, even if it manages to survive the
protective gauntlet established by the second and third prescriptions.
For transformationalists strong enforcement provisions are detrimental to more than the inclusiveness of a regime in its initial stages.
Their adversarial and coercive character also operates to sabotage the
transformational process by alienating States from the open-ended dialogue and information sharing that drive the transformational process."
Brunn6e and Troope even suggest that the nature of enforcement
mechanisms promotes the exclusion of intergenerational interests from
regime dialogues.
Terms like noncompliance should be eliminated from regime discourse lest they precipitate an unraveling of the consensus-building
process. Even the terminology of "compliance," it is argued, promotes
the crystallization of such issues as disputes. It makes more sense transformationalists believe to focus on the less value-laden term of
"implementation," which is "broad enough to encompass the progressive development of norms and, when necessary, issues of adherence to
established norms."4
In the place of strong enforcement, transformationalists recommend
a softer approach that "is likely to facilitate the confidence building
necessary for the creation of a regime, as well as encourage broader
participation by States." 4 This soft alternative is simply an elaboration
of the managerial strategy already described and emphasizes the role of
negotiation and consultation Within iterated, regime-sponsored negotiating rounds. If self-reporting and monitoring reveal that a State is not
meeting its obligations, other Member States will confront the recalcitrant party and cajole it back into compliance.
The transformationalist assertion that strong enforcement impedes
the cooperative evolution of a multilateral or a regime is provocative,
44. See Patrick Szdll, The Development of Multilateral Mechanisms for Monitoring
Compliance, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-109 (Winfried

Lang ed., 1995).
45. See Brunnde & Troope, supra note 42, at 46.
46. Id. at 45; The argument that the terminology used to characterize "less than full
compliance" is critical to the evolution of cooperation is not new. See Martti Koskenniemi,
Breach of Treaty or Noncompliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL L. 145 (1992).
47. Brunnde & Troope, supra note 42, at 57.
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but how valid is it? Before trying to answer this question directly, it
makes sense to begin by examining whether the transformationalist
claims about the nature of state preference change and regime evolution
are themselves correct. In particular, it would be helpful to consider the
strength of the evidence for believing that processes such as collective
deliberation and the diffusion of information among regime members
are the major engines of state preference change and regime evolution
that they are believed to be. If these processes are relatively unimportant
or if they are important only under limited conditions, the argument that
enforcement may jeopardize the future evolution of a regime because it
undermines these properties loses much of its force.
A considerable body of empirical research, much of it by economists, suggests that changes in state (as well as individual) preferences
are much more likely to come about as the result of relative price
changes that often take place in the wake of technological innovation
than as the result of a shift in normative values. Certainly there are a
number of environmental agreements for which this appears to be the
case. The Paris Commission's' (PARCOM) decision to ban the use of
oil-based "muds" in drilling new oil and gas wells appears to have been
greatly facilitated by the development of substitute water-based
"muds. 49 Similarly, one of the reasons that the United States, the largest
producer and consumer of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in 1985, was
able to assume an important leadership role in promoting and then
strengthening the Montreal Protocol was that its major producers had
quickly responded to mounting evidence about the dangers of CFCs by
developing acceptable substitutes.' This provided large and politically
powerful chemical firms like Dupont and Allied Signal with a strong
incentive to lobby for rather than against the creation of a regime that
would oversee their elimination.
Relative prices and the rate of technological change have also
played a central role in arms control. The development of the reconnaissance satellite, for example, played a key role in the evolution of arms
control by increasing transparency and reducing the necessity of costly
and controversial on-site inspections."
48. See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 76, 89 (1977).
49. See Peter M. Haas, Protecting the Baltic and North Seas, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
EARTH 164 (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993).
50. TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 113 (1997).
51. See John Lewis Gaddis, The Evolution of the Reconnaissance Satellite Regime, in
U.S.-SOVIET SECURITY COOPERATION 353, 365 (Alexander L. George et al. eds., 1988); see
also Steven Weber & Sidney Drell, Attempts to Regulate Military Activities in Space, in U.S.SOVIET SECURITY COOPERATION, supra, at 373.
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Economic trends not directly connected with changes in relative
prices can also have a significant impact on preferences. For example,
the growing tension between the North and the South over a host of
environmental issues suggests that per capita income and economic
development are major determinants of environmental consciousness. If
environmental consciousness were primarily determined by collective
deliberation or the diffusion of cost information, we would not expect
per capita income and environmentalism to be so highly related. The
growth in international trade is another economic trend that also appears
to have affected state policy preferences. The exact mechanism by
which it does this is not clear but one suspects that as export-oriented
firms and industries flourish relative to import-competing firms, this
reduces the political power of the import-competing firms and changes
the balance of political power. This leads the government to become
increasingly sympathetic to still higher levels of economic cooperation. "
Not only is there reason to believe that the major determinants of
State preference change are economic, but there is also reason to believe
that the impact of intra-regime information diffusion and collective
deliberation is less clear cut than transformationalists imply. With regard to the former, there is no reason to believe that in an era of
aggressive NGOs and mass media the diffusion of information will be
restricted to those States that are members of a regime or multilateral.
Multilaterals may function to provide information somewhat more
quickly to members, but any relevant information should eventually
reach nonmembers as well. Certainly, no evidence has been presented
that nonmembers fail to embrace more aggressive environmental, human rights, or intellectual property regulatory goals because they have
less information about the underlying problems than do regime members.
With regard to the impact of collective deliberation, the issue is not so
much whether it can be important-it clearly can-but how frequently it
is effective and under what circumstances. These are important questions
because while the fact tends to go unnoted in the transformationalist literature, collective deliberation often leads nowhere. Indeed, international
politics is littered with collective deliberations that appear to have had
little or no impact on the preferences of the negotiating parties. The negotiations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China over
integration, between the two Koreas regarding consolidation, and between
52. For a more subtle argument focusing on the demand for liberalization resulting from
the negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements, see MICHAEL J. GILLIGAN, EMPOWERING
EXPORTERS 135 (1997).
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Greece and Turkey over Cyprus are only a few of the hundreds of examples.
The highly uncertain success rate of collective deliberation in inspiring preference change is no reason not to engage in it, but it does
raise the issue of opportunity costs. This is because, as we have seen, in
the transformationalist vision collective deliberation is almost invariably
linked with inclusiveness. If collective deliberation always succeeds in
changing state preferences, this makes sense. By increasing the number
of States that are involved in the collective deliberation process, greater
inclusiveness will produce more preference change and more cooperation in the international system. However, if collective deliberation
operates more effectively on some States than others, a policy of inclusiveness might seriously obstruct the rate of collective progress that
could otherwise have been achieved by a smaller multilateral.
The potential opportunity costs of inclusive collective deliberation
play virtually no role in the transformationalist literature, but there is
good reason to believe that they are often real enough. Suppose instead
of going ahead with the original Coal and Steel Agreement or the first
European Community, Germany and France had been persuaded to
embrace collective deliberation as a transformation strategy and had
incorporated Britain in the kind of weak agreement that it would have
found unthreatening. How long would it have taken collective deliberation to alter British preferences in favor of integration? How much more
slowly would the EC have evolved?
The European Community is not an isolated example. The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was formalized and ratified without the
participation of India and China and other States that were unwilling to
agree to the very modest constraints it represented. Was this a miscalculation? Were the States in favor of NPT wrong in concluding that the
costs of pursuing extended collective deliberation with these States and
doing nothing in the meantime were too high?
The most prominent recent example of the same trade-off is the recent land mine agreement, which is far more stringent than the one
currently in force. Iran, Iraq, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan have all
refused to take part, and the United States is insisting on a number of
changes that many States believe will significantly dilute the agreement.3 From a transformationalist perspective, the best strategy for the
one hundred plus nations that are ready to sign the new agreement
would be to return to negotiations with the States that were not willing
sign until collective deliberation succeeded in changing the latter's
53. See David E. Sanger, U.S. In Shift, Says It May Sign Treaty to Ban Land Mines, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at Al.
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preferences. This is especially true in this case because we are not taking about just a few recalcitrant States-a contingency for which
transformationalists occasionally allow-but about a substantial number
of the world's major military powers. Yet, States ready to sign the
agreement have rejected this logic apparently concluding that in this
case the costs of the delay associated with further collective deliberation
were too high.'
The trade-off between waiting until inclusive collective deliberation
has adequately socialized nearly every state before preceding to create a
more demanding agreement and creating an initially smaller but more
demanding agreement is relevant to the enforcement debate. It suggests
a novel strategy for dealing with what transformationalists quite rightly
see as a kind of collective action problem with the enforcement model;
that is, while it might be true in theory that States could achieve deeper
cooperation with higher levels of enforcement, States often do not want
more enforcement. The opportunity costs discussion suggests that if the
problem is not so much that all of the States are against more enforcement but that a minority of States do not want it, a solution may lie in
forming an initially smaller, less inclusive agreement and then expanding it over time through a process of sequential admissions as States (or
the agreement itself) attains some property that they did not possess at
the time the agreement was initially constructed. For example, after
having created such an agreement Member States might wait for
changes in relative prices or the evolution of some other factor to
change the preferences of nonmembers who initially found strong enforcement provisions unpalatable.
Whether this strategy will work depends on the number of States
that are initially driven away from the more strongly enforced agreement, how much deeper it is than the larger agreement would be, and
what is expected to happen over time. Obviously, if a large number of
states initially refuse to join the deeper and better enforced multilateral
and then continue to refuse to become members because they feel alienated from an institution that they played no role in creating, the trade-off
could well be a poor one.5 This is what the transformationalists contend
54. Signatory states may also have decided, in contrast to the tenets of transformationalism, that the existence of an agreement will operate to put more social pressure on
nonsignatories than could be directed at them in the context of further collective deliberation.
55. This is not to suggest that this kind of alienation is the only reason why states that
are initially excluded from an agreement might choose to remain outside it. As noted in the
last section, there are also a host of incentive compatibility issues rising from the costs and
benefits of multilateral membership that will vary depending on any number of factors (e.g.,
the good being regulated). See George W. Downs et al., Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism, 52 INT'L ORG. (forthcoming Spring 1998).
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will invariably happen. If, however, there is reason to believe that the
smaller, deeper agreement will grow larger faster than the rate at which
the broader more shallow agreement grows deeper, it may be the better
choice.
In order to begin to evaluate the relative merits of the transformational strategy and this sequential alternative, we took the same set of
fifty environmental agreements previously described and identified
fourteen agreements that at the time of their signing possessed each of
the structural attributes prescribed in the transformationalist literature,
and seven agreements that were created sequentially with much higher
levels of enforcement.5 6 We found that, the median transformational
agreement has achieved a level of cooperation that is significantly less
than the median sequential agreement and nearly a third of the transformational agreements appear to have achieved nothing. 7
The difference in depth between the two types of agreements would
be of no more than passing interest if it were simply a function of size.
One expects that the Scandinavian states acting alone will often be able
to formulate a more demanding agreement than will a large multilateral
made-up of every Western and East European country. Fortunately, this
does not appear to be a problem. The difference between the two types
of agreements is still significantly different after controlling for the
effect of size.
Most notably, the sequential agreements were able to expand their
membership by an average of 308 percent over the history of the agreements. This suggests that the transformationalist claims that
enforcement interferes the ability of regimes to evolve productively and
that states are reluctant to join agreements that they did play a role in
creating are exaggerated. In fact, the ability of sequentially created
agreements with a high level of enforcement to grow combined with the
findings about relative depth raise the prospect that the capacity of sequential agreements to expand may well be greater than the capacity of
transformationalist agreements to grow deeper.
These results should not be interpreted to suggest that the sequential
approach to regime design is always better or even always feasible. One
important precondition for effectiveness is that the benefits that will
stem from the smaller, deeper, and better enforced agreement have to be
substantial. This will not always be the case in areas such as human
rights or security where an agreement that excludes a subset of
"recalcitrant" States may accomplish next to nothing. The land mine
56. See Downs et al., Designing Multilaterals, supra note 33, at 17-19.
57. On our relatively crude depth scale the median sequentially constructed agreement
is fifty-three percent deeper than the median transformational agreement. See id. at 19.
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agreement passes this test because land mines are a significant problem
among many of the signatory States in Asia and Africa and the benefits
of a less than universal agreement are believed to be considerable."
However, an agreement among European states to outlaw female circumcision or an agreement among developing States to ban research on
anti-ballistic missile systems would generate few such benefits. Under
such circumstances an inclusive approach or a mixed strategy that initially omits no more than a handful of difficult States may be better
alternatives.

CONCLUSION

Doubtless motivated partly by decades of realist charges that international law was largely irrelevant to the conduct of international
relations because it could not be enforced, international lawyers have
joined forces with an increasing number of regime theorists to argue that
the role of enforcement in sustaining the ever-increasing level of cooperation present in the international system is extremely small and that
enforcement can actually operate to inhibit the growth of cooperation.
Without denying that enforcement is, in general, neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for institutionalized cooperation, this essay has
attempted to provide a cautionary note regarding these claims.
The group that I have termed managerialists do not argue that the
political economy theory of enforcement is invariably invalid, but they
do suggest that enforcement is usually inappropriate because most violations are unrelated to deliberation and premeditation. In response to
this the argument was made that many of the compliance violations that
arise out of ambiguity or capacity problems may not be as disconnected
from deliberation as they often appear to be because both ambiguity and
incapacity are to some extent endogenous. While it is true that some
ambiguity problems are inevitable and capacity limitations are often
very real, it is also true that ambiguity in treaty language and claims of
incapacity are often instrumentally useful for States. Within certain
bounds, States deliberately choose how ambiguous to make treaties and
how much oversight capacity they will employ in connection with a
given agreement.
Managerialists also charge that formal enforcement provisions and
unilateral sanctions are essentially irrelevant. States, however, appear to
58. Cambodia is believed to contain more than ten million land mines, Angola more
than nine million. See Jody Williams, Peace Prize Goes to Land-Mine Opponents, N.Y.
TiMES, Oct. 11, 1997, at Al.
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believe differently. Data were presented from fifty environmental
agreements that corroborate the political economy theory of enforcement's prediction that States will be reluctant to create ambitious
agreements unless they have more elaborate enforcement provisions
than the typical agreement. The histories of cooperative agreements
such as the European Union also suggests the theory's prediction that
the evolution of cooperation will necessitate the evolution of an increasingly elaborate, and increasingly formal enforcement apparatus is
correct.
The transformationalist argument that enforcement interferes with
the evolution of a cooperative multilateral received no more substantiation. State preferences unquestionably do change over time and often in
the direction of preferring higher levels of cooperation, but there is little
evidence that such changes are invariably or even usually brought about
by transformational forces. This suggests that the extent to which the
transformational dynamic is dampened by strong enforcement provisions may be less relevant to the evolution of interstate cooperation than
is often supposed. Beyond this, there is reason to believe that the transformationalist prescriptions that collective deliberation should be
inclusive and that decisionmaking in mulitlaterals should be consensual
can tie the fate of a regime to the slow transformation rates of states that
are very resistant to change. This may be one reason why environmental
multilaterals that are inclusive tend to evolve more slowly than those
that use more enforcement but strategically omit conservative states in
the early years of their development.
In short, while it may be appropriate to dismiss realism for its
wrongheaded (and tireless) adherence to the claim that enforcement
must be the cornerstone of any significant international cooperation, it is
premature to dismiss enforcement as largely irrelevant or to claim that it
acts as a major impediment to the evolution of cooperation. Like collective deliberation or any other strategy for promoting cooperation, it has
strengths and limitations that both international lawyers and political
economists have only begin to unravel.

